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Abstract
This report analyses the labour conditions of migrant workers in the EU in the context
of the COVID-19 epidemic. By looking at the prevalence of temporary contracts,
the position in the income distribution and the likelihood that jobs can be conducted
from home for both key and other migrant workers, it highlights the potential and
distinct vulnerabilities for these two groups. Foreign born workers - especially Extra-
EU migrants - are at a disadvantage in all three dimensions: they are more likely to be
in temporary employment, earn lower wages and have jobs that are less amenable to
teleworking. The report concludes by identifying possible areas of policy intervention
to address these vulnerabilities.
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Key Messages
• Among key workers, EU mobile and Extra-EU workers are concentrated in low skilled
professions.
• The highest shares of migrant workers is among the cleaners and helpers (38%), labour-
ers in mining and construction (23%), stationary plant and machine operators (20%)
and personal care workers (19%).
• EU mobile and Extra-EU key workers are 16% and 48% more likely to be employed
under temporary contracts than natives, respectively.
• More than half of EU mobile and Extra-EU key workers fall in the bottom four deciles
of the overall income distribution.
• The higher probability of temporary employment and lower wages for foreign key work-
ers - especially Extra-EU ones - compared to natives, persists even when accounting for
di↵erences in occupation, education, age and gender composition between the groups.
• A high share of foreign born key workers are employed in occupation non amenable to
telework.
• Other extra-EU workers are particularly vulnerable to forced shutdowns being fre-
quently employed in non-teleworkable occupations, on temporary contracts and be-
longing to the bottom of the income distribution.
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1 Introduction
“Key workers” are at the front line of Europe’s COVID-19 response, performing the crucial
tasks of keeping European citizens healthy, safe and fed during the pandemic. Understand-
ing who these workers are and under which conditions they can e↵ectively continue provid-
ing their essential services is a crucial element of any informed strategy to cope with the
pandemic. Two recent studies have estimated that foreign born workers account for large
fractions of this “essential workforce”: 19% of key-workers in the US (Gelatt, 2020) and 13%
in the EU (Fasani and Mazza, 2020) are migrants, while they make up approximately 17%
and 13.3% of the employed workforce, respectively.1 Since migrant workers typically experi-
ence an overall weaker status in host country labour markets, assessing to which extent this
vulnerability a↵ects migrant key-workers is the first step to devise policy interventions that
may allow them to better cope with the ongoing crisis and keep contributing to its solution.
This report unfolds as follows. Section 2 discusses possible dimensions of vulnerability
of migrants workers. Section 3 presents the data used and briefly describes our methodology.
Section 4 discusses the presence of migrant workers in key occupations. Section 5 focuses
on native-immigrant gaps for key-workers in the probability of having a fixed-term contract
(section 5.1) and in the position in the earnings distribution (section 5.2). Section 6 assesses
to which extent migrant occupations - for both key and other workers - can be performed
from home. Section 7 concludes with a brief discussion of policy implications.
2 Migrant Key Workers and Vulnerability
Several factors may lead us to expect migrant workers to be more vulnerable to the COVID-
19 pandemic than natives. Migrant workers typically experience a weaker socio-economic
integration than natives. As relative new-entrants in the host country labour markets, they
are generally more likely to have fixed-term contracts, to work under non-standard contract
and informal arrangements and to have shorter job tenure. Their earnings are typically
lower than that of comparable native workers, implying a lower ability to accumulate sav-
ings. Further, migrants’ residence status typically determines their entitlement to welfare
state provisions, limiting their access with respect to natives (Avato et al., 2010). This vul-
nerability may be exacerbated in the midst of a pandemic and of the associated economic
contraction which is triggered by government-imposed lockdowns and by the fall in citizens’
demand for goods and services. Migrants are more likely to lose their job during economic
downturns (Dustmann et al., 2010): a higher likelihood of becoming unemployed associated
with lower savings and with limited access to the safety net is a recipe for economic des-
titution and marginalization. For migrants on temporary visas, it may also jeopardize the
chances of renewal of their residence documents, forcing foreign workers to either return
home or stay as undocumented immigrants. In addition to these pre-existing factors that
1This share is for 2019 and still includes the U.K. Source: Eurostat.
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tend to make migrants’ economic situation particularly dire during recessions, there may
be pandemic-specific risks that disproportionately a↵ect them. Migrants may face a higher
health hazard than natives if they are more exposed to the contagion: this may happen if
they tend to live in more densely populated areas, to work in particularly crowded condi-
tions and to be concentrated in occupations that envisage more direct contact with other
individuals (e.g. care workers, elderly care) and, in particular, with individuals potentially
infected (e.g. health workers). Further, any additional hurdle that migrant workers may
face in accessing health care and receive medical attention becomes extremely salient here,
increasing the chances that exposure to contagion leads to dramatic health consequences.
The peculiar nature of the economic recession caused by the pandemic - in particular,
its di↵erential impact on sectors of the economy depending on whether they are considered
essential or not - likely implies heterogeneous e↵ects on the vulnerability of migrants in
key and in other occupations. If migrant key workers may face a low - or even reduced
- probability of losing their job despite the ongoing economic downturn, their exposure to
the pandemic may be very high, being placed at the front line of the COVID-19 response.
The opposite is true for migrants who were not employed in key-sectors (or not employed
at all) before the pandemic developed: while the stay-at-home orders will shield them from
contagion, their economic situation is bound to rapidly deteriorate.
The extent to which non-essential jobs can be carried out with teleworking has sud-
denly become a crucial element to preserve employment levels. Although evidence based on
social experiments (Bloom et al., 2015; Angelici and Profeta, 2017) suggests workers’ produc-
tivity enhancements due to shift to working from home, teleworking arrangements are still
relatively uncommon, being below 10% in most countries (Eurofound and the International
Labour O ce, 2017). Boeri et al. (2020) estimate that the share of jobs that could potentially
be carried out from home varies between 20 and 30% in selected EU countries. Whether the
shift to teleworking will help also migrant workers employed in non-essential sectors to keep
their jobs will primarily depend on the type of occupations they were employed in before
the pandemic spread. Teleworkability has substantial distributional consequences as higher
skilled professions tend to be more amenable to telework than low skilled ones. Mongey et al.
(2020) using February and March CPS data for the US find that professions ranking low in
teleworkability and high in their physical-proximity measure experienced larger employment
declines relative to pre-epidemic February-March changes. Furthermore, these job losses are
a↵ecting the most vulnerable disproportionately. Key workers do not risk mass layo↵s since
their function is essential during the epidemic, nonetheless, whether they can work from
home or not has implications for them as well. Social distancing measures are intended to
protect the population from infection by minimizing the occasions of personal interaction.
Given their particular role key workers are exempt from these measures and are asked to
carry out their functions regardless of whether they can be performed from home or not.
But this exposes those key workers whose profession is not teleworkable (i.e. doctor, nurses,
refuse workers) to a higher chance of contagion than the rest of the population.2
2For example, stories have emerged of widespread contagions occurring in meat process-
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3 Data and Methodology
We use the most recent wave (2018) of the EU Labour Force Survey (EU-LFS) for our
analysis. We restrict the sample to employed workers aged 15-64 and distinguish two groups
of migrant workers based on their country of birth: EU mobile citizens (i.e. workers born in
a EU Member State other than the one where they currently work and reside) and Extra-EU
migrants (i.e. workers born outside of the Union). Further, we define as native anyone who
was born in the current country of residence. Our sample includes 1,737,682 individuals, of
which 1,548,223 are natives, 70,431 EU-mobile and the remaining 119,028 Extra-EU workers.
Our definition of key workers is based on the Communication from the Commission
on Guidelines concerning the exercise of the free movement of workers during COVID-19
outbreak3 supplemented with the Dutch definition of key workers.4 We identify key work-
ers based on ISCO-08 occupations at three digits, which is the most detailed classification
available in the EU-LFS.5 Note that both the Commission’s and the National’s definitions
often refer to a finer ESCO four digits classification.6 Our definition is thus necessarily more
generous than the original one, but there are no obvious reasons to expect this discrepancy
to a↵ect the comparisons between natives, EU migrants and Extra-EU migrants that we
discuss below.
In our empirical analysis, we explore di↵erent dimensions of the vulnerability of mi-
grants in key occupations: temporary contracts (section 5.1), position in the income distri-
bution (section 5.2) and possibility of teleworking (section 6). We discuss evidence on overall
di↵erences in outcomes between natives and migrant key-workers as well as on estimation
results from regression analysis. In our regressions, we compare natives and immigrants with
similar observable characteristics (age, sex, education, occupation) and estimate conditional
di↵erentials in the outcomes of interest.
4 Migrant Workers and Key Occupations in the EU
Figure 1 compares the concentration of natives and migrant workers in di↵erent key occupa-
tions. We distinguish occupations in high and low qualifications ones based on the median
ing plants, a key industry, in the US. Source: https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/
nearly-900-workers-tyson-foods-plant-indiana-test-positive-coronavirus-n1197776
3https://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?langId=en&catId=89&furtherNews=yes&newsId=9630
4https://www.government.nl/topics/coronavirus-covid-19
5A full list of our definition of key profession is provided in the appendix Table 1.
6ESCO is the European implementation of ISCO and therefore the two classifications can be easily
mapped into each other.
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level of education of the workers employed in each ISCO 2-digits occupation.7 Teaching,
health and health associate, ICT, science and engineering professionals belongs to the first
category while all other occupations fall in the second one. Among high qualified occupa-
tions, Figure 1 shows that migrants are particularly concentrated in the low qualification
professions. The three most frequent key occupations for Extra-EU migrants (cleaners and
helpers, personal care workers and drivers and mobile plants operators) belong to this group,
as two out of the three most frequent occupations for EU mobile key workers do. The most
frequent occupation for natives, instead - teaching professionals - is a high qualification one.
Figure 1: Share of Key Workers, by Key Occupation
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Note: Occupations are defined following ISCO 2 digits classification.
In Figure 2, we report the share of migrant workers - EU mobile (blue bars) and
Extra-EU (red bars) - in each key occupation for the entire EU area separating low and
high qualification professions. While foreign born workers account for 13% of key workers
in the EU (Fasani and Mazza, 2020), in many key occupations we observe shares which are
substantially larger. In particular, We observe the highest shares of migrants in low qualified
occupations such as cleaners and helpers (38%), labourers in mining and construction (23%),
stationary plant and machine operators (20%) and personal care workers (19%). In high
skilled occupations, instead, we have share varying between 8% among teaching professionals
and 14% among ICT professionals.
7We defined high skilled occupations all those occupations whose workforce median educational level is
above ISCED level 3, while low skilled occupations are those whose workforce median level of education is
equal or below that.
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Figure 2: Share of Migrant Key-Workers, by Key Occupation
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5 Migrant-Native Gaps for Key-Workers
5.1 Temporary contracts
The share of workers aged 15-64 who are employed with temporary contracts in the EU is
approximately 11%. As Figure 3 shows, this share varies widely across Member States, being
close to zero in Eastern Countries such as Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia and Romania while
being above 20% in Spain (red dots in the graphs). These percentages are similar among
key workers (blue bars), with the EU average being equal to 11%.
In Figure 4 we report the percentage point di↵erence between migrants and natives in
the share of key workers with temporary contracts in each Member State. Both groups of
migrants are more likely to have a temporary job than natives, although to di↵erent extents.
On average, the di↵erence is equal to 1.8 p.p for EU Mobile and to 5.3 p.p. for Extra-EU
workers (see dashed lines in the figure) which correspond to a 16% and 48% higher proba-
bility of being a temporary employee with respect to the average value (11%), respectively.
The migrant-native di↵erentials for EU-mobile workers (red bars) are mostly positive (with
the exception of Slovakia, Ireland, Austria, Hungary and Slovenia) but relatively small in
magnitude. We observe large di↵erentials only in Italy (10 p.p.), Greece (8 p.p.), Denmark
(7 p.p.) and Hungary (6 p.p.). The di↵erentials are far larger for Extra-EU workers (blue
bars): they are above 10 p.p. in four countries - Poland (21 p.p.), Cyprus (18 p.p.), Italy (13
p.p.) and Spain (11 p.p.) - and vary between 8 and 10 p.p. in other six countries (France,
6
Figure 3: Share of Temporary Contracts, by Country0.110.05.1.15.2.25  AT  BE  BG  CY  CZ  DE DK  EE  ES  FI  FR  EL  HR  HU  IE  IT  LT  LU  LV  NL  PL  PT  RO  SE  SI  SK% of temporary contracts key workers% of Temporary contracts overall
Note: The bars report the share of temporary contracts among key workers in the country. The diamonds
represent the share of temporary contracts overall in the country. The dashed line indicates the EU
average of temporary contracts (11%).
Sweden, Czech Republic, Luxembourg, Finland and Greece).
The native-migrant gap in the probability of being in temporary employment may
increase or decrease once we take into account the di↵erences in individual characteristics
between natives and immigrants. If being a young worker is strongly associated with having
a temporary contract, for instance, migrants may appear over-represented among temporary
workers because they are typically younger than the native population (see Appendix Figure
13). Our regression analysis allows to compare the probability of being on a temporary
contract for migrants and natives while holding constant their observable characteristics. We
report our estimates for the conditional migrant-native gap by member states for EU mobile
and Extra-EU workers in panel (a) and (b) of Figure 5. For both group of migrants the vast
majority of positively signed bars suggest that migrants tend to be more likely than natives
to have temporary contract even once you compare workers with similar characteristics and
employed in similar occupations.8 The estimated gap for EU mobile workers (Figure 5, panel
a) is relatively small and not statistically di↵erent from zero in approximately half of the
EU countries, while it gets larger in size and becomes strongly significant in most countries
for Extra-EU workers.
In Figure 6 we report estimated coe cients from a similar exercise, but we now estimate
8In our regressions, we condition on occupation dummies, gender, educational level, age, age squared,
country of residence and migration status.
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Figure 4: Probability of Having a Temporary Contract: Migrant vs. Native Key-Workers,
by Member State
1.85
5.35
-10
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Extra EU
EU Mobile
Note: The bars report the percentage point di↵erence for the probability of having a temporary contract
between native and migrant key workers. The red dotted line indicates the EU average for the EU mobile
vs. native di↵erence (1.55 percentage points), while the blue dotted line indicates the EU average for the
Extra-EU vs. native di↵erence (5.35 percentage points).
gaps by key occupation rather than by Member State. We distinguish high and low skilled
occupations (blue and red bars, respectively). Even within occupation, migrant workers
are more likely to have a temporary contract than natives, although the gaps for Extra-EU
workers (panel b) are larger (and more often statistically di↵erent from zero) than for EU
mobile. Remarkably, we observe significant gaps for EU migrants almost exclusively in high
skill occupations, while for Extra-EU workers we find significant gaps in both low and high
skill jobs.
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Figure 5: Native-Migrant Gap in Temporary Contract Probability, by Member State-.2-.10.1.2  AT  BE  BG  CY  CZ  DE  DK  EE  ES  FI  FR  EL  HR  HU  IE  IT  LT  LU  LV  NL  PL  PT  RO  SE  SI  SKProbability difference vs. natives
(a) EU Mobile-.20.2.4.6  AT  BE  BG  CY  CZ  DE  DK  EE  ES  FI  FR  EL  HR  HU  IE  IT  LT  LU  LV  NL  PL  PT  RO  SE  SI  SKProbability difference vs. natives
(b) Extra-EU
Note: Coe cients estimated with OLS regression in a model controlling for occupation, gender, educational
level, age, age squared, country of residence and migration status. The thick blue bars represent the
coe cient for the interaction between a migration status dummy and host country dummies. The thin
black bars represent the 95% confidence intervals.
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Figure 6: Native-Migrant Gap in Temporary Contract Probability, by Occupation Science and Engineering Professional Health Professionals Teaching Professionals ICT Professionals Science & Eng. Associate Professionals Health associate professionals ICT Technicians Personal Service Workers Personal Care Workers Market-oriented Skilled Agricultural  Workers Food Processing, etc. Stationary Plant and Machine Operators Drivers and Mobile Plant Operators Cleaners and Helpers Labourers in Mining, Contruction, Manuf., & Transport Refuse Workers -.2 -.1 0 .1 .2Probability difference vs. nativesLow Skill High Skill
(a) EU Mobile Science and Engineering Professional Health Professionals Teaching Professionals ICT Professionals Science & Eng. Associate Professionals Health associate professionals ICT Technicians Personal Service Workers Personal Care Workers Market-oriented Skilled Agricultural  Workers Food Processing, etc. Stationary Plant and Machine Operators Drivers and Mobile Plant Operators Cleaners and Helpers Labourers in Mining, Contruction, Manuf., & Transport Refuse Workers -.1 0 .1 .2 .3Probability difference vs. nativesLow Skill High Skill
(b) Extra- EU
Note: Coe cients estimated with OLS regression in a model controlling for occupation, gender, educational
level, age, country of residence and migration status. The thick blue bars represent the di↵erence in the
probability of being employed with a temporary contract between natives and migrants. The thin black
bars represent the 95% confidence intervals.
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5.2 Labour Income
In Figure 7, we report the labour income distribution for key workers (filled bars) and
all workers (transparent bars) for natives, EU mobile and Extra-EU (panels a, b and c,
respectively). The comparison between colored and empty bars for natives (panel a) shows
that the income distribution for key workers is more polarized than the overall distribution,
with relatively higher shares of key-workers falling in the bottom decile and the top three
deciles of the distribution. Foreign born workers displays a rather distinct pattern: their
income distribution is skewed to the left, with approximately 48% of EU mobile (panel b)
and 53% of Extra-EU workers (panel c) in the bottom four deciles. The distribution of
migrant key workers is even more skewed to the left: approximately 54% of EU mobile
and 59% of Extra-EU key-workers fall in the bottom four deciles. If we just focus on the
bottom decile, the share of EU-mobile migrants increases from 11% to 16% when we move
from overall workers to the subset of key workers, whereas it grows from 16% to 22% for
Extra-EU workers.
Figures 8 and 9 show that income gaps between native and migrant key-workers persist
even when controlling for individual characteristics and comparing individuals employed in
the same occupations. Indeed, Figure 8 reports regression coe cients for the native-migrant
gap in probability of being above the median of the income distribution. With the exception
of the positive coe cients estimated in Bulgaria and Spain, significant gaps for EU-mobile
workers are all negative (panel a), being particularly large in countries such as Italy (-25 p.p),
Greece (-21 p.p), Luxembourg (-21 p.p.) Lithuania (-19 p.p.) and Cyprus (-17 p.p.). The
probability of belonging to the upper half of the income distribution with respect to natives
is even lower for Extra-EU workers (panel b): we observe negative and large gaps in most EU
countries, exceeding 20 p.p. in Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg and Latvia. In contrast
with this general pattern, however, we estimates small - but statistically significant - gaps
for Extra-EU workers in Austria, Spain, Finland and Sweden. The analysis by occupation
in Figure 9 generally confirms that both migrant groups tend to have a lower probability
of having earning above the median with respect to comparable natives who are employed
in the same key-occupations. Nevertheless, we estimate positive and significant coe cients
for EU mobile workers in two high skill occupations (health professionals and service and
engineering professionals) while only science and engineering professionals earn more than
their native counterparts in the case of Extra-EU workers.
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Figure 7: Labour Income Distribution Key Workers vs. All workers0.05.1.15 0 2 4 6 8 10Monthly take home pay from main job (deciles)OverallKey WorkersDensity
(a) Natives
0.05.1.15 0 2 4 6 8 10Monthly take home pay from main job (deciles)OverallKey WorkersDensity
(b) EU Mobile0.05.1.15.2.25 0 2 4 6 8 10Monthly take home pay from main job (deciles)OverallKey WorkersDensity
(c) Extra-EU
Note: The colored bars represent the
deciles of monthly take home pay for
Native (Panel 7a), EU mobile (Panel
7b) and Extra-EU (Panel 7c) key work-
ers. The transparent bars represent the
deciles of monthly take home pay for all
workers by area of origin.
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Figure 8: Native-Migrant Gap in Probability of Being in the Upper Half of Labour Earnings
Distribution - by Country-.4-.20.2.4  AT BE BG CY CZ DE DK EE ES  FI  FR EL HR HU IE  IT  LT LU LV NL PL PT RO SE  SI  SKProbability difference vs. natives
(a) EU Mobile-.6-.4-.20.2.4  AT BE BG CY CZ DE DK EE ES  FI  FR EL HR HU IE  IT  LT LU LV NL PL PT RO SE  SI  SKProbability difference vs. natives
(b) Extra-EU
Note: The thick blue bars represent the di↵erence in the probability of being in the top half of the monthly
earnings distribution between natives and migrants. The thin black bars represent the 95% confidence
intervals. The probabilities are estimated via OLS in a model controlling for gender, educational level,
age, country of residence and migration status.
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Figure 9: Native-Migrant Probability Gap in Being in the Top Half of Labour Earnings
Distribution, by Key Occupation Science and Engineering Professional Health Professionals Teaching Professionals ICT Professionals Science & Eng. Associate Professionals Health associate professionals ICT Technicians Personal Service Workers Personal Care Workers Market-oriented Skilled Agricultural  Workers Food Processing, etc. Stationary Plant and Machine Operators Drivers and Mobile Plant Operators Cleaners and Helpers Labourers in Mining, Contruction, Manuf., & Transport Refuse Workers -.4 -.3 -.2 -.1 0 .1Low Skill High SkillProbability difference vs. natives
(a) EU Mobile Science and Engineering Professional Health Professionals Teaching Professionals ICT Professionals Science & Eng. Associate Professionals Health associate professionals ICT Technicians Personal Service Workers Personal Care Workers Market-oriented Skilled Agricultural  Workers Food Processing, etc. Stationary Plant and Machine Operators Drivers and Mobile Plant Operators Cleaners and Helpers Labourers in Mining, Contruction, Manuf., & Transport Refuse Workers -.4 -.2 0 .2Low Skill High SkillProbability difference vs. natives
(b) Extra-EU
Note: The thick blue bars represent the di↵erence in the probability of being above the median of the
monthly earnings distribution between natives and migrants.The thin black bars represent the 95% con-
fidence intervals. The probabilities are estimated via OLS in a model controlling for occupation, gender,
educational level, age, country of residence and migration status.
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6 Are Migrants’ Occupations Teleworkable?
In this section, we analyse whether migrant workers are particularly vulnerable to being
dismissed (income risk) or to infection (health risk) depending on whether they are key
workers or not and by looking at how migrants are distributed among teleworkable or non-
teleworkable professions. Our measure of teleworkability is taken from Dingel and Neiman
(2020). This measure is based on responses to two Occupational Information Network
(O*NET) surveys covering “work context” and “generalized work activities.” The 6-digits
Standard Occupational Classification (SOC) is then mapped into the 2-digits ISCO classifi-
cation available in the EU-LFS.
6.1 Key-workers
We first analyse the health-risk of migrant key workers. We do so by looking at the concen-
tration of migrant workers in key occupation and the share of teleworkable jobs calculated
with the Dingel and Neiman (2020) procedure. In Figure 10 we plot the share of migrants in
each key occupation on the horizontal axis against the share of jobs that can be performed
from home in each ISCO 2-digits category on the vertical axis. Panel 10a refers to EU
mobile workers while Panel 10b to Extra-EU workers. The figure reveals a clear negative
relationship highlighted by the red line of best fit drawn in the graph. Almost no job in
the two professions with the highest concentration of migrants - cleaners and helpers and
labourers in mining, construction, manufacturing or transport for both groups of migrants
- can be performed at home. While the share of migrant in professions that can be more
easily carried out from home - e.g. teaching professionals and ICT technicians - is below
5% for both groups as well. The figure highlights how the particular tasks that migrant key
workers perform are exposing them to a high chance of contagion.
6.2 The Vulnerability of Migrant Workers Employed in Other Oc-
cupations
Despite their vulnerability in the labour market, migrant workers employed in key occupa-
tions in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic may be less at risk of losing their jobs than
equally fragile migrant workers who are employed in other non-essential occupations. Indeed,
while key sectors are fully operational during the crisis (and possibly even experiencing an
increase in demand), other sectors will su↵er major losses in revenues, exposing workers
employed in these latter industries to a higher risk of losing their jobs with respect to those
employed in the former. We assess this income-risk by looking at the share of temporary
contracts in each of the other occupations and the teleworkability index described above.
Our assumption here is that workers with temporary contracts and whose job is hard to do
from home, are those more likely to be dismissed in times of crisis.
In Figure 11 we plot the share of temporary contracts against the share of jobs that can
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be performed from home by ISCO 2-digit occupations. Panel 11a describes this relationship
for EU mobile workers while Panel 11b for Extra-EU workers. For reference, we have added
two dashed line to the graph: The vertical line represents the mean share of works that
can be performed from home by occupation over the entire sample, while the horizontal
line represents the mean share of temporary contracts by occupation. The two lines create
four quadrants, the bottom left quadrant includes all those occupations in which both the
share of temporary contracts and the share of teleworkability is below the mean; the bottom
right quadrant includes occupations below the average for share of temporary contracts and
above the average for teleworkability ; the top right quadrant includes occupations above the
average for both measures; finally, in the top left quadrant we find all those occupations
having an above average share of temporary contracts and a below average teleworkability
index. Occupations in the top left quadrants are those whose workers are at higher risk of
dismissal as their contracts o↵er less protection and their function cannot be carried out
e↵ectively during the lock-downs. In the graph, each dot represents an occupation and we
have labeled and highlighted in red the five most common occupation for migrant workers
who are not employed in the key-sectors as designated by European or national authorities.
These occupations employ 42.3% and 42.5% of EU mobile and Extra-EU workers respectively.
For EU workers (Panel 11a) two out the top five occupations lay in the bottom right quadrant
where the least vulnerable professions are found, and the other three lay in the bottom left
quadrant being below average in teleworkability as well as share of temporary contracts. The
situation is certainly worse for Extra-EU workers (Panel 11b): in their case, four out of the
five most common occupations lay in the top left quadrant where the high temporary/low
teleworkability professions are found.
In Figure 12 we analyse the income distribution for those Extra-EU migrants employed
in the four professions that we have identified as particularly vulnerable due to their high
frequency of temporary contracts and low teleworkability. The figure highlights that these
workers tend to earn lower salaries then the average worker employed in these occupations.
More than half of them earn salaries in the bottom four deciles of the income distribution.
This evidence shows that Extra-EU workers employed in these professions are particularly
vulnerable due to the high risk of dismissal combined with their low incomes. Should they
lose their job due the lockdown, they would be unlikely to be able to resort to private savings
for subsistence during lockdown and until they are able to find another job.
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Figure 10: Key Occupations: Teleworkability and Share of Migrant WorkersScience and engineering professionalsTeaching professionals ICT professionalsICT technicians Personal care workers Cleaners and helpers0.2.4.6.81 .02 .04 .06 .08 .1 .12Share of migrant workersShare teleworkable jobs
(a) EU MobileScience and engineering professionalsTeaching professionals ICT professionalsICT technicians Personal care workersStationary plant and machine operators Cleaners and helpersLabourers in mining/constr./manuf./transport0.2.4.6.81 .05 .1 .15 .2 .25Share of migrant workersShare teleworkable jobs
(b) Extra-EU
Note: The red line represent the line of best fit.
17
Figure 11: Other Occupations: Temporary Contracts and Teleworkability
Business and administration professionals
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(a) EU Mobile
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Note: The red dots represents the top 5 occupations for share of migrants. The vertical dashed line
represents the average share of jobs that can be done at home by occupation; the horizontal dashed line
represents the average share of temporary contracts by occupation for migrants.
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Figure 12: Income Distribution Other Workers, Overall vs. Vulnerable Extra-EU0.05.1.15 0 2 4 6 8 10Monthly take home pay from main job (deciles)Overall Extra EU Migrants in Vulnerable ProfessionsDensity
Note: The vulnerable professions are those found in the top-left quadrant of Figure 11b
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7 Policy Implications and Conclusions
In Fasani and Mazza (2020) we show that migrant key workers are essential to keep European
economies running even if at lower pace. In this report we analysed how these essential
migrant workers fare compared to native key workers on three dimensions: the level of
protection o↵ered by their contract, their pay, and the possibility to carry out their function
from home during the pandemic. What we find is that migrant key workers, especially
Extra-EU key workers, are particularly vulnerable. They are more frequently employed
under temporary contracts, earn lower wages and their professions are less amenable to be
performed from home when compared to native key workers.
When we extend our analysis to the other workers not employed in the designated
key-occupations, we find that also within this group migrant workers, and again, especially
Extra-EU ones, are more vulnerable than natives. As for migrant key workers they earn lower
wages, are more likely to be employed under temporary arrangements and in professions that
cannot be performed from home. What changes for this group of migrant workers are the
implications of these combined vulnerabilities. These workers are exposed to a high level
of income-risk as they are forced by shelter-in-place orders to stay home, but at the same
time are employed in jobs that are less amenable to teleworking and that more frequently
rely on temporary contractual arrangements. The risk for these workers of being laid o↵ is
high, since their firing costs are extremely low and their employers are under strain due to
the shut-downs. Additionally should they loose their jobs, they are unlikely to be able to
fall back on personal savings as their income level tends to be low.
The evidence produced in this report calls for policy actions targeted at migrant workers
that should possibly di↵erentiate according to whether they have been defined as essential or
non-essential workers. The urgency of implementing measures to support migrant workers
during the pandemic crisis has been emphasized by international institutions such as the
World Bank (2020) and think thanks such as the Overseas Development Institute (ODI).9
The concentration of migrant workers in fixed-term contracts that we document, for instance,
points at interventions on employers’ incentives - via reduced taxation or subsidies - to renew
these contracts and retain their workers. Migrants’ lower earnings suggest the need for policy
action on income support schemes, which may take the form of widening migrants’ access
to existing welfare programs as well as of creating new schemes that specifically target
foreign workers. Finally, migrants’ exposure to the contagion and to health hazard calls for
interventions that remove - at least temporarily - existing barriers to full health care access
for non-citizens. Not only migrants’ welfare is at stake here, but it is also in the interest
of hosting societies to create the conditions for migrant workers to keep contributing to the
solution of the ongoing crisis and to the future recovery.
9See the ODI’s initiative on “Migrants’ contribution to the Covid-19 response” at: https://www.odi.
org/migrant-key-workers-covid-19/.
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8 Appendix
Figure 13: Age Structure Extra-EU Migrants0.01.02.03 20 30 40 50 60AgeOverallExtra EU MigrantsDensity
Note: .
Table 1: Key Workers Occupations
ISCO-08 2 digits ISCO-08 3 digits
Science and Engineering Professional Life science professionals
Engineering professionals
Health Professionals Health professionals
Medical doctors
Nursing and midwifery
Traditional and complementary medicine
Paramedical practitioners
Other health professions
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Teaching Professionals University and higher education teachers
Vocational education teachers
Secondary education teachers
Primary school and early childhood teachers
Other teaching professionals
ICT Professionals Information and communication technology
Software and applications developers
Database and network professionals
Science & Eng. Associate professionals Sci. and engineering assoc. professionals
Physical and engineer science technicians
Mining, manufacturing and constructions
Process control technicians
Life science technicians
Ship and aircraft controllers and technicians
Health associate professionals Medical and pharmaceutical technicians
Nursing and midwifery
ICT Technicians Information and communications technicians
ICT operations and user support technicians
Telecommunications and broadcasting technicians
Personal Service Workers Travel attendants, conductors and guides
Other personal services workers
Personal Care Workers Personal care workers
Child care workers and teachers’ aides
Personal care workers in health services
Market-oriented Skilled Agricultural Workers Market-oriented skill agricultural workers
Market gardeners and crop growers
Animal producers
Mixed crop and animal producers
Market-oriented Skilled Forestry Fishery Fishery workers, hunters and trappers
Food Processing, etc. Food processing and related trades workers
Stationary Plant and Machine Operators Food and related products machine operators
Drivers and Mobile Plant Operators Locomotive engine drivers
Car, van and motorcycle drivers
Heavy truck and bus drivers
Ships’ deck crews
Cleaners and Helpers Domestic, hotel and o ce cleaners and helpers
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Vehicle, window, laundry and other cleaning
workers
Labourers in Mining, Construction,
Manufacturing Transport and storage labourers
Refuse Workers Refuse Workers
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